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SOUTH AFRICA
From Confrontation to Cooperation
By Mohamed El-Khawas
(First of two parts)
I n the 1990s, unlike many previous de­cades, Southern Africa appears to be inching closer to an era of peaceful co­
existence.
At long last, South Africa appears to 
be shifting from a confrontational stance 
to that of cooperation with its neighbors, 
particularly Angola and Mozambique. 
But this has not always been the case. 
On the contrary, South Africa’s destabili­
zation campaigns, which began in the 
mid-1970s, have wreaked havoc in the 
region. As you will read in this two-part 
series—the first part on Angola/South 
Africa conflicts, and the second part on 
Mozambique/South Africa conflicts—it 
was a no-win situation for South Africa 
from the start.
South Africa embarked on a destabili­
zation campaign in several of its neigh­
boring countries by the early 1980s. Pre­
toria’s goal was to slow, if not halt, the 
liberation struggles within its own bor­
ders and in Namibia. The destabilization 
campaign was designed to pressure 
neighboring governments to withhold as­
sistance from the liberation movements, 
namely South Africa’s African National 
Congress (ANC) and Namibia’s South 
West Africa People’s Organization 
(SWAPO). At the time, these move­
ments had established camps within the 
borders of several neighboring front-line 
countries and were using these bases to 
launch their armed struggles.
' South Africa’s aggressive stance paid 
off in Swaziland and Lesotho, two land­
locked nations that rely on South Africa 
for economic survival and for contact 
with the rest of the world. Using its mili­
tary and economic power, Pretoria 
forced these vulnerable governments to 
oust South African refugees suspected of 
being ANC fighters.
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The neutralization of these two coun­
tries left Mozambique and Angola as the 
only routes to South Africa and Namibia 
open to the liberation movements, with 
Zimbabwe already having decided to halt 
ANC military operations out of its terri­
tory. Consequently, Mozambique and 
Angola bore the brunt of South African 
military actions.
A detailed examination of the record of 
South Africa’s destabilization of Angola 
and Mozambique reveals the consider­
able extent of this activity during the last 
several years.
In this two-part analysis, each country 
is singularly dealt with because Pre­
toria’s relationship with Angola and Mo­
zambique differed in style and substance. 
South Africa’s hostility toward Angola 
dates back to the 1975-1976 civil war, 
for example, while its destabilization 
campaign against Mozambique did not 
begin until 1981.
The destabilization campaign itself 
was multifaceted, ranging from direct 
military intervention and the backing of 
anti-government insurgency, to outright 
economic warfare.
South Africa and Angola
South Africa has been Angola’s bitter 
enemy ever since the Movimento Popu­
lar de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) 
came into power in 1975 when Angola 
became independent from Portuguese 
colonial rule. South Africa’s goal was to 
deny any kind of governing power to the 
MPLA. It did not work, mainly because 
the new Angolan government, under the 
banner of the MPLA, fought back.
With the support of the United States, 
South Africa opposed the MPLA’s social­
ist ideology, its close ties to the Soviet 
bloc, and its commitment to majority rule 
in Southern Africa. The plan was to in­
stall pro-Western factions in power in 
Angola, namely the Frente Nacional de
Libertacao de Angola (FLNA) and the 
Uniao Nacional para a Independencia 
Total de Angola (UNITA).1 Both South 
Africa and the U.S. believed a friendly 
regime woudl protect Western interests 
in the region; halt growing Soviet influ­
ence in Africa; and slow the tide of liber­
ation that was rapidly approaching the 
borders of Namibia and, indeed, South 
Africa.
A civil war engulfed Angola shortly 
after its independence and continues to 
this day. But following early MPLA vic­
tories, with the support of Cuban troops 
and a massive Soviet arsenal, South 
Africa initiated an aggressive stance di­
rected at Angola. In December 1977, 
South Africa’s Prime Minister John Vor- 
ster announced his country’s plan for 
military intervention in the form of 
“large-scale, pre-emptive, and follow-up 
strikes.”2 Shortly thereafter, South Afri­
can forces raided a SWAPO base at Cass- 
inga, in southern Angola, and kidnapped 
145 Namibian refugees. And in March, 
1979, South African planes bombed an 
ANC military training camp inside 
Angola.3
Two years later, Pretoria had become 
even more aggressive toward Angola, 
with the occupation in 1981 of a substan­
tial area of southern Angola.4 This was 
done ostensibly to halt SWAPO’s infil­
tration across the border and, in turn, to 
cut the level of its activities inside Nami­
bia. The European Economic Commu­
nity (EEC) reported in 1981 that South 
African troops were “involved in nearly
2,000 operations inside Angola” and their 
aggression “caused nearly $7 billion in 
damage and displaced 13,000 persons 
between 1975 and 1980.”5
South African invasions and bombings 
in southern Angola have been coupled 
with South African support for Angolan 
rebel forces. Pretoria has continued to 
provide financial and material assistance
for UNITA’s protracted war. It also has 27 
allowed UNITA to use South Africa’s 
broadcasting facilities to spread anti- 
government propaganda in Angola.6 In 
addition, Black members of the South 
African Army joined UNITA forces dur­
ing some of its operations.7
UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, has ac­
knowledged his connection with South 
Africa, an arrangement that has enabled 
him to sustain the civil war since 1976.
As Robert I. Rotberg put it: “South Afri­
can air cover, logistical and refueling sup­
port and, at times, direct military inter­
vention have been critical in the growth 
of UNITA as a formidable fighting 
machine.”8
With Pretoria’s material and physical 
backing, UNITA has conducted a cam­
paign designed “to grind the Angolan 
economy down, to halt development, and 
destroy agriculture.” Such a campaign 
has had damaging effects on Angola’s 
economy, “rendering the diamond mines 
unprofitable, . . . destroying the food ex­
porting sector, . . . and forcing suspen­
sion of most development projects.”9 It 
has made it unsafe for foreigners to work 
in the mining sector and has shut down 
the Benguela Railroad which, prior to in­
dependence, took in as much as $100 
million a year from transporting minerals 
from Zambia and Zaire to Atlantic coast 
ports.
Also, UNITA’s insurgency has suc­
ceeded in disrupting the economy and in 
diverting national resources away from 
needed economic development. About 
75 percent of the Angolan national bud­
get is taken up by military expenditures; 
the country has spent $2 billion on Soviet 
weapons in two years, for example, to 
shore up its military capabilities to fight 
both UNITA’s insurgency and South Afri­
ca’s undeclared war.10
South African forces have repeatedly 
intervened militarily on UNITA’s behalf
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28 when the going got rough. In September 
1985, for instance, when the Angolan 
Army captured Cazombo and was pre­
paring to attack Savimbi’s headquarters 
in Jamba, South Africa’s heavy air strikes 
saved UNITA.11 Four months earlier, 
Angolan and Cuban forces had foiled an 
attack on Chevron oil installations in Ca­
binda by South African commandos.12
Thus, UNITA has been able to expand 
its destabilization campaign because of 
South Africa’s assistance—a campaign 
that has been directed against Angolan 
civilians, foreign technicians, and eco­
nomic targets.
UNITA’s destabilization campaign, 
coupled with South Africa’s military in­
tervention, have made Angola’s security 
heavily dependent on Cuban troops. Cu­
bans have enabled Angolans to fend off 
repeated South African military incur­
sions, which had increased in frequency 
and intensity since 1981. In addition, 
Cuban forces freed the Angolan Armed 
Forces to meet threats posed by 
UNITA’s campaign in southeast Angola.
As noted before, Pretoria’s support for 
UNITA and its periodic invasion of 
Angola were “aimed at toppling the 
MPLA government and installing a more 
sympathetic regime.”13 Thus far, 
however, this strategy has been a failure.
The Namibia Factor
Angola, from early on, has been pursuing 
a negotiated settlement for the conflict in 
Namibia. And it was responsive to West­
ern initiatives on this matter—initiatives 
spearheaded by the United States under 
the Carter administration. The Angolan 
government was also instrumental in ob­
taining SWAPO’s approval for the West­
ern plan for Namibia’s independence 
from South Africa’s military occupation, 
which was also approved by South Africa 
and embodied in the U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 435 in 1978. That
The Angolan government 
showed some flexibility by 
publicly committing itself 
to the removal of Cuban 
troops.
plan called for a cease-fire and U.N.- 
supervised elections for a National As­
sembly that would draft a constitution 
leading to independence.14
In the 1970s and well into the 1980s, 
South Africa showed no intention of im­
plementing the Western plan, apparently 
out of concern that SWAPO would win at 
the ballot box. Pretoria, with the encour­
agement of the Reagan administration, 
demanded the removal of all Cuban 
troops from Angola as a precondition for 
Namibia’s independence.15
Angola’s immediate reaction was to re­
fuse to negotiate the withdrawal of 
Cuban troops as part of the parcel for 
Namibia’s settlement. Lucio Lara, then 
secretary-general of Angola’s ruling 
party, asserted that “these are two en­
tirely different problems.” He added that 
Cuban troops “have been staying in 
Angola at the request of the Angolan 
government.”16 [It should be noted here 
that the Cuban presence was critical to
Angola, especially to its ability to defend 
itself against South Africa’s continuing 
aggression and to combat the insurgency 
efforts of UNITA. Southern Angola, for 
instance, was occupied by South Africa 
at one time for up to two years. ]
The Angolan government through 
Paolo T. Jorgo, then foreign minister, 
made it clear that “when the threat from 
South Africa disappears—and we believe 
it will with the independence of 
Namibia—then we won’t need the Cuban 
presence here.17 This was largely be­
cause Namibia likely will serve as a buf­
fer zone between Angola and South 
Africa. Furthermore, independent Nami­
bia, under SWAPO, will not likely allow 
UNITA to operate out of its territory. It 
is expected that, under these conditions, 
UNITA’s insurgency would wither away.
As the stalemate over the linkage of 
Cuban withdrawal and the independence 
of Namibia continued, South Africa un­
leashed its military might against Angola. 
In December 1983, South Africa invaded 
Angola; its artillery and bombers struck 
about 200 miles deep into Angola in a 
bold attempt to cripple SWAPO 
operations.
South African officials argued that “the 
operation is designed to increase 
pressure on the Angolan authorities to 
withdraw their support from SWAPO, 
just as South Africa is seeking to per­
suade Mozambique to disown the 
ANC.”18 Ironically, this South African in­
vasion of Angola “coincided with a U.S.- 
sponsored effort to foster warmer re­
lations between South Africa and Mo­
zambique.”19
When the South African operation 
continued for several weeks, Moscow, in 
an unusual diplomatic move, asked Pre­
toria to get out of Angola. The Soviets 
made it clear that “South Africa’s contin­
ued occupation of part of Angola is unac­
ceptable.”20
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To save its policy of “constructive en­
gagement,” the U.S. moved to reduce 
tensions between South Africa and 
Angola. At the end of January 1984, 
Chester A. Crocker, then assistant 
secretary of state for African affairs, was 
able to persuade South Africa to begin 
pulling out its troops. His effort led to: 
the signing of a cease-fire between South 
Africa and Angola; the withdrawal of 
South African troops from southern 
Angola; and the establishment of a joint 
commission, including American 
observers, to monitor military disen­
gagement along the Angolan-Namibian 
border.21
Encouraged by the cease-fire agree­
ment, Pretoria launched its own initiative 
to settle the outstanding issues in the re­
gion. In March 1984, Foreign Minister 
Roelof F. Botha proposed the convening 
of a regional conference to solve the re­
maining problems in Namibia and Angola. 
He called for a meeting of South Africa, 
Angola, UNITA, SWAPO and Namibia’s 
internal parties to discuss their problems 
and to reach a broader regional 
settlement. Angola, however, rejected 
Botha’s proposal. The Luanda govern­
ment had objections to sitting down with 
UNITA or with Pretoria to discuss its in­
ternal affairs.22
On the Cuban troops issue, the Ango­
lan government showed some flexibility 
by publicly committing itself to the re­
moval of Cuban troops from Angola. In a 
joint communique in Havana in March 
1984, Angola’s President Jose Eduardo 
dos Santos and Cuba’s President Fidel 
Castro proposed a gradual Cuban with­
drawal from Angola provided the follow­
ing conditions were met:
■  A unilateral withdrawal of South 
African soldiers from Angolan 
territory.
■  The acceptance of [the] United 
Nations ruling calling for the with-
In August 1988, Crocker 
succeeded in getting 
South Africa to withdraw 
its forces from southern 
Angola.
drawal of South African troops 
from Namibia and its “true” in­
dependence.
■  The cessation of all acts of ag­
gression against Angola by South 
Africa, the United States and its 
allies, and an end to aid for 
“counter-revolutionaries.”23 
The first two conditions were easy to 
meet because the withdrawal of South 
African troops from Angola was already 
underway and was expected to be com­
pleted by mid-April if Angola fulfilled its 
pledge to halt SWAPO’s infiltration 
across the border. In addition, Pretoria 
had publicly committed itself to imple­
menting the 1978 U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 435 once an agreement was 
worked out for the withdrawal of the 
Cuban troops. As for the third condition, 
there seemed to be no problem since 
South Africa had signed a non-aggression 
pact with Mozambique.24 The key ques­
tion hinged on whether Pretoria was in
fact using the Cubans as a pretext to fur- 29 
ther delay Namibia’s independence.
A Stumbling Block
The Angolan government tried again to 
break the stalemate over the Cubans, 
which had become a stumbling block in 
the way of Namibia’s independence. In 
October 1985, dos Santos reiterated his 
offer to negotiate the withdrawal of 
Cuban troops from his country. He pro­
posed a phased withdrawal of 20,000 
Cuban soldiers while keeping about
12,000 in the capital and around Cabin­
da25 to protect Chevron’s oil installations, 
which generate as much as 90 percent of 
Angola’s foreign exchange earnings. But 
another hitch developed. The Reagan ad­
ministration aligned itself with South 
Africa by insisting that UNITA be in­
cluded in “a national reconciliation gov­
ernment.”26
In response, Angola’s foreign trade 
minister, Ismael Gasper-Martins, said in 
Washington, in January 1986, that his 
government had no intention of forming a 
coalition with UNITA, which Angola 
viewed as a South African proxy. He 
warned that U.S. aid to Angolan rebels 
was “bound to have a negative impact on 
the U. S.-brokered negotiations between 
his government and South Africa for the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola 
and the independence of Namibia.”27
Despite this warning, the Reagan ad­
ministration resumed covert military as­
sistance for UNITA,28 assistance which 
had been cut off in 1976.
Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem, Angola’s 
minister of energy and petroleum, de­
nounced the Reagan administration’s re­
newed support for UNITA’s Savimbi. He 
said his government was firm in its “re­
fusal to negotiate a political settlement 
with [Savimbi].” Van-Dunem also noted 
that U.S. military assistance for UNITA 
would force Luanda to seek additional
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30 military aid from the Soviet bloc; it would 
also increase Angola’s dependence on 
Cuban troops.
Angola’s immediate answer to the re­
sumption of U.S. military aid to UNITA 
was to suspend its participation in U.S.- 
sponsored talks on the withdrawal of 
Cuban troops and the independence of 
Namibia. This boycott lasted for more 
than a year. But in April 1987, Angolan 
and American officials met in Brazzaville, 
Congo, and agreed to resume nego­
tiations.29
Although more talks formally opened 
in Luanda in July 1987, no progress was 
made. American officials elected to wait 
until Angola submitted new proposals to 
break the stalemate over the Cuban 
troop withdrawal.
In response, dos Santos met with Cas­
tro in Havana in August and expressed 
his readiness to be more flexible in nego­
tiations. The U.S. welcomed the state­
ment but asked for more specific propo­
sals on the issue.30 No progress was 
made and the Angolan government em­
barked on a military solution for the civil 
war in 1987. It launched massive of­
fenses to attempt to wipe out UNITA’s
forces by destroying its supply and com­
munications lines, and by capturing its 
headquarters in Jamba. But a swift mili­
tary intervention by South Africa saved 
UNITA, again.31
In response to the rising tensions be­
tween Luanda and Pretoria, dos Santos 
made a request for additional Cuban 
troops to shore up Angola’s defenses. 
Consequently, between 10,000 and
15,000 new Cuban troops arrived in 
1988, bringing the total to 50,000. The 
Angolan authorities resolved to deploy 
Cuban troops in the south, raising the 
possibility of a military confrontation with 
South Africa. In addition, new airfields 
were opened at Cahama and Xangongo, 
giving the Angolan Air Force new capa­
bilities to challenge South Africa’s viola­
tions of Angola’s southeastern airspace.32
The Botha government was faced with 
a dilemma. It knew it would be costly to 
try to push the Cuban troops away from 
the border with Namibia. Also, it knew 
this would probably result in higher 
numbers of casualties among white 
South Africans. Consequently, the South 
African military concluded that there was 
a need for a negotiated settlement to get 
the Cubans out of Angola and to scale 
down Pretoria’s military involvement in 
Southern Africa.
A Final Settlement
In May 1988, the U.S. tried again to find 
a broader settlement for the conflicts in 
Southern Africa. The adversaries were 
ready to move forward this time because 
Washington and Moscow pressured them 
to find political solutions.
In August 1988, Crocker succeeded in 
getting South Africa to withdraw its 
forces from southern Angola. He then 
continued his mediation efforts toward an 
agreement on the Cuban troop with­
drawal from Angola, as well as for Nami­
bia’s independence. His efforts paid off.
After several meetings at five lo­
cations between South Africa, Angola, 
and Cuba, under U.S. auspices—in Lon­
don, Cairo, New York, Geneva and Braz­
zaville—two agreements were signed on 
December 22, 1988. Consequently,
Cuban troops were phased out of Angola 
starting in April 1989, with total with­
drawal expected to be completed by July 
1991.
As for Namibia, South Africa reduced 
its forces to 1,500 in the territory by July 
1989. This was accompanied by the de­
ployment of a U.N. peace-keeping force 
in the territory. And in November 1989, 
the U.N. supervised a historical election 
for a Constituent Assembly.
The Assembly’s adoption of a new 
constitution put Namibia on the road to 
independence—on March 21, 1990.33
These developments have left UNITA 
out in the cold. South Africa has pledged
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to halt its assistance to UNITA. This 
does not mean that the civil war in 
Angola has come to an end, however, be­
cause President Bush has assured Sa- 
vimbi that American military assistance 
will continue and his administration will 
withhold recognition of the Luanda gov­
ernment until a settlement is reached. 
American officials have urged African 
governments to pressure both sides in 
the Angolan conflict to form a govern­
ment of national reconciliation.34
African mediation has resulted in the 
signing of the Gbadolite Accord on June 
22, 1989. Both dos Santos and Savimbi 
have agreed on an immediate cease-fire 
and have accepted Zaire’s President Mo­
butu seso Seko’s mediation to prepare 
the implementation of the national recon­
ciliation plan.35 Since then, however, vio­
lations of the cease-fire have been fre­
quent. And Savimbi has not shown up for 
scheduled meetings in Zaire. This has 
cast doubts over the possibility of ending 
the civil war in Angola in a speedy 
fashion.
Nevertheless, the dramatic develop­
ments within South Africa lately, among 
them the unbanning of the ANC and the 
release of ANC leaders, including Nelson 
Mandela, from prison, may well halt 
South Africa’s support for UNITA. □
Next: South Africa and Mozambique.
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